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Contracts-Considerafion-Subconfracfor Bidding*
The doctrine of promissory estoppel presents an exception to the
general rule that a promise not supported by a valid consideration is
unenforceable. 1 This doctrine has been developed in cases where a
promisee, to his detriment, has acted in reasonable reliance on a
promise not supported by consideration and injustice would result
if the promise were not enforced. 2 The "reasonable reliance" is said
to serve "in lieu of the consideration ordinarily required to make the
offer binding."' 3 Thus, the "reasonable reliance" serves to support
the promise. This is the essence of promissory estoppel.'
Promissory estoppel has been applied to various fact situations
where a promisee has relied upon a promise to his detriment.' It
has been applied in cases where there were promises not to plead
the statute of limitations, 6 promises to make charitable contributions,7 gratutitous promises to extend, renew, or modify leases,8
promises of pensions to employees, 9 promises of gifts for personal
12
services, 10 promises of franchises to dealers," and many others.
There has been some controversy as to whether promissory estoppel should be applicable in commercial cases, and more specifically,
in subcontract-bidding situations.
In the recent New Mexico case of Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson,3
the supreme court indicated that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
was not applicable to commercial cases in New Mexico. The plaintiff, a prime contractor, was awarded a contract for the construction
* Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966).
1. 1A A. Corbin, Contracts §204 (1963).
2. Id.
3. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 411, 333 P.2d 757, 760 (1958).
4. The doctrine is well expressed in Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932) :
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee
and which does induce such action of forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
For an analysis of the elements of promissory estoppel see Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459 (1950).
5. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956).
6. Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 211 P.2d 806 (1949).
7. Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 34 Del. Ch. 427, 104 A.2d 903 (1954).
8. Drake v. Eggleston, 123 Ind. App. 306, 108 N.E.2d 67 (1952).
9. Hunter v. Sparkling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948).
10. Klein v. Farmer, 85 Cal. App. 2d 545, 194 P.2d 106 (1948).
11. Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
12. See generally, Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956).
13. 76 N.M. 729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966).
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of a junior high school. When he was preparing his bid for the construction of this and also a bid for the construction of Bayard Elementary School, he sent invitations to several suppliers, including the
defendants, to make subcontract bids on various items including
folding tables and benches. The prime contract specifications called
tables and benches "as manufactured by Schieber Mfg.
for twelve
Co.' 1 4 In response to the invitation, the defendant suppliers sent
the following telegram:
Re: Bayard Elementary School. We offer fourteen (14) folding
tables and benches Specifications Section 16-3 standard HamiltonErickson products $4,858.00 ...
Re: Cobre Junior High School. We offer ten (10) [Hamilton-Erickson] folding tables and benches as above specification section 15-6 for
$3,470.00.

....

15

The contractor took the total price quoted in the supplier's bid
for Cobre Junior High and divided it by ten to get a unit price. He
then multiplied this unit price by twelve and used the resultant figure,
$4,164.00, in his own bid.'
On the day after the contractor was awarded the contract on the
Cobre Junior High School job, he called the supplier and congratulated him on being the low bidder for the folding tables and benches.
The supplier replied that he was not sure that the standard Hamilton-Erickson tables, as bid, would meet the specifications of the
architect but that maybe the architect would accept them anyway.
Tatsch replied that he would "expect him to furnish a product that
would be acceptable to the architect." When the supplier refused to
supply any tables and benches except their own standard HamiltonErickson products, the contractor sued for breach of contract. 7
The trial court found for the contractor, ruling that there had
14. Id. at 730, 418 P.2d at 188.
15. Brief for Appellant at 5, 6, Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M.
729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966). The statement "as above specification section 15-6 . . ." in
the bid regarding Cobre Junior High School refers to the specifications given by the
bidder himself in the bid regarding Bayard Elementary School. Since the telegram
was the only thing sent by the bidder to the contractor, "as above specifications" could
not refer to anything except a previous part of the telegraphic offer. It would not
refer to "Specification section 16-3" since the specifications for Cobre were "specifications 15-6." It could only refer to the "above specifications" given by the bidder, that
is, "standard Hamilton Erickson products."
16. Id. at 7.
17. Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966).
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been a binding contract formed between the two parties which called
folding tables and benches meeting
for the supplier to furnish twelve
18
the architect's specifications.

On appeal the New Mexico Supreme Court held, Reversed; the
offer had been revoked before it was ever accepted. The court based
its holding on the following rule of law: "An offer not under seal or
given for a consideration may be withdrawn at any time prior to an
unconditional acceptance by the off eree."' 9 The court also said that
promissory estoppel could not be applied to make the offer irrevocable. The court cited James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.2" for the
proposition that "such offer so relied upon [does not] constitute a
promissory estoppel. '" 21 The court, in citing Baird, at least implies
that promissory estoppel is not applicable in commercial cases.
The purpose of this Comment is first, to demonstrate that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel should apply to commercial cases in
New Mexico and second, to emphasize the fact that the Uniform
Commercial Code provision on the firm offer has modified the rule
of law relied upon by the court.
Perhaps the leading case to hold that promissory estoppel is not
applicable in such cases is the one cited by the court, James Baird Co.
v. Gimbel Bros.22 In this case the defendant was a supplier of linoleum who prepared a subcontract bid to supply the linoleum requirements for a proposed building. He sent a copy of his bid to twenty
or thirty contractors, including the plaintiff, who were bidding on
the new building. The contractor who was awarded the contract had
used the supplier's offer in his own bid. Before he could accept the
supplier's offer, the supplier found it had made a mistake in the
estimate and revoked its offer. The contractor sued the supplier for
breach of contract. The court, in an opinion written by Judge Hand,
held that there was no contract because the offer was revocable until
accepted and it had been revoked before it was accepted. Judge
Hand, recognizing that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was applicable in cases involving gratuitous promises for charitable subscriptions said:
But an offer for an exchange is not meant to become a promise
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 734, 418 P.2d at 189.
64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 729, 733, 418 P.2d 187, 189

(1966).
22. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
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until a consideration has been received, either a counter-promise or
whatever else is stipulated. . . .There is no room in such a situa23
tion for the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel.'

Eight years after the Baird decision, the Seventh Circuit in Robert

Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,

24

rejected the idea that promis-

sory estoppel was not applicable in commercial cases. This case also
involved a contractor and a supplier. The contractor and his competitor asked the supplier for price quotations on refrigeration units.
The price quote was ambiguous and could have been interpreted as
offering two units for the price of one. The contractor used this interpretation of the figure in his own bid even though his competitor
recognized the ambiguity in the offer and called the supplier to
determine the correct figure. The supplier notified the contractor of
the correct meaning of the offer but the contractor had already used
the other figure in his bid. When the contractor was awarded the
prime contract, he attempted to accept the offer as he had interpreted
it. When the supplier would not perform the contract at that price,
the contractor sued for breach of contract. The court would not allow the contractor to recover on the theory of promissory estoppel
because he had not satisfied the element of "justifiable reliance."
However, the court made it plain that promissory estoppel was applicable in such situations: "However we choose not to follow the
Baird case. The mere fact that the transaction is commercial in
nature should not preclude the use of the promissory estoppel. ' 2 5
A more recent case involving a similar fact situation is Brennan v.
Star Paving Co. 20 There, the general contractor used the defendant's
subcontract bid in his general bid and was awarded the prime contract. The day after the award the subcontractor told the general
contractor that he could not do the job at the bid price since there
had been a mistake in the subcontractor's estimate. The general
contractor sued the subcontractor for breach of contract. In an
opinion written by Justice Traynor, the California Supreme Court
applied section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts and held that the
23. Id. at 346. The decision in Baird was immediately criticized. One critic noted
that it was hard to see how injustice was any less repugnent in commercial cases than
in charitable subscription cases. Note, 20 Va. L. Rev. 214 (1933). For further criticism
see, comment, 28 Il1. L. Rev. 419 (1933).
24. 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941).
25. Id. at 661.
26. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
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offer was irrevocable for a reasonable time. Justice Traynor used the
following reasoning:
Defendant had reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely on its bid
but to want him to. Clearly defendant had a stake in plaintiff's
reliance on its bid. Given this interest and the fact that plaintiff is
bound by his own bid, it is only fair that plaintiff should have at
least an opportunity to accept defendant's bid after the general contract has been awarded to him.

Defendant's mistake should not defeat recovery. It should foresee
harm which would ensue from erroneous underestimate. It was
motivated by its own interest. It should exercise reasonable care in
preparing its bid. .

.

. As between the subcontractor who made

the bid and the general contractor who reasonably relied on it, the
loss resulting from the mistake should fall on the party who
7
caused itY

The doctrine of promissory estoppel is now recognized in many
jurisdictions as being applicable in commercial cases.28 If the doctrine of promissory estoppel had been applied in Tatsch v. Hamilton.
Erickson,29 the case would still have been decided in favor of the
defendant, Hamilton-Erickson. As in the case of Robert Gordon,
Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,3o the contractor, Tatsch, would still have
been unable to meet the requirement of "justifiable reliance." The
offer in Tatsch was ambiguous as was the offer in Ingersoll-Rand. It
could have been interpreted as meaning that "standard HamiltonErickson products" would meet the architect's specifications or it
could have been interpreted as an offer for "standard HamiltonErickson products" as a substitute for those "as manufactured by
27. Id. 333 P.2d at 760, 761.
28. Since the case of James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933),
few cases have held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable in

commercial cases. Most have recognized the doctrine as being applicable: Robert
Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Weiner v. Romley,
94 Ariz. 40, 381 P.2d 581 (1963) ; Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 211 P.2d 806
(1949) ; C. H. Leavell and Co. v. Grafe & Associates, Inc., 414 P.2d 873 (Idaho 1966) ;
Hedden v. Lupinsky, 405 Pa. 609, 176 A.2d 406 (1962) ; Northwestern Engr. Co. v.
Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1953) ;Wheller v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.
1966) ; Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 404 P.2d 30 (Utah 1965) ; Hilton v. Alexander &
Baldwin, Inc., 400 P.2d 772 (Wash. 1965).
29. 76 N.M. 729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966).
30. 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941).
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Schieber Mfg. Co." With Tatsch's knowledge of the situation it
could not be said that he relied on this ambiguous offer in good
faith. 8

Promissory estoppel should be applicable in commercial cases in
New Mexico under the proper circumstances. This view is not
wholly without precedent in New Mexico. In Kingston v. Walters,82
the New Mexico Supreme Court said: "Where a representation as
to the future relates to an intended abandonment of an existing
right, and is made to influence others, and they have been influenced
by it to act, it operates as an estoppel." ' The Kingston case can be
distinguished in that it involved a sale of property but to paraphrase
one of the criticisms of the Baird decision: it is hard to see how injustice is any less repugnant in commercial cases than in property
4
cases.3
The reasoning of Justice Traynor in Drennan v. Star Paving5 is
an excellent argument of why promissory estoppel should be applicable under the proper circumstances. A contractor should be able
to rely on the offer of a subcontractor or supplier. The revocation
of a sub-bid after the contractor has relied on it in his main bid
could mean the difference between a profit and a loss. The ancient
doctrine of consideration should not be allowed to inflict injustice
and hardship on a party who, to his detriment, relied in good faith
on a promise.
A second ground open to the plaintiff in Tatsch would have been
to argue for the applicability of section 2-205 of the Uniform Com31. There are several reasons for this. First is the fact that the offer was ambiguous on its face. Also Tatsch knew that the University Book Store was the exclusive
agent in New Mexico for products manufactured by Schieber Mfg. Co. Further, the
offer was for ten folding tables and benches and Tatsch tried to rely on it as an offer
for twelve. There was also apparently a large discrepancy in the price quotations of
the various offers. The price of the Hamilton-Erickson products would have been
$4,164.00. Tatsch finally purchased products that would meet the specifications for
$7500.00. That is $3336.00 or about eighty per cent more than the price of the Hamilton-Erickson products. This should have put Tatsch on notice that the Hamilton-Erickson products might not meet the specifications.
32. 16 N.M. 59, 113 P. 594 (1911). In this case there was a written agreement that
the buyer would have until Aug. 26, to make a partial payment for the purchase of
land. If the payment was not made, the buyer was to forfeit a previous payment and
the right to buy the land. The seller orally agreed to let the buyer have "five or ten
days" extra to make the payment. The buyer attempted to pay Sept. 1, and the seller
said the payment was too late. In its decision the court ruled that the buyer could make
the payment even though the oral promise was not supported by consideration.
33. Id. at 60, 113 P. at 595.
34. See note 23 supra.
35. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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mercial Code.8 This is the firm offer provision which says: "An offer
by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for
lack of consideration . . .
This certainly modifies the rule of law relied on by the court that:
"An offer not under seal or given for a consideration may be
withdrawn8 at any time prior to an unconditional acceptance by the
offeree."

3

It is not clear what is included in the phrase, "which by its terms
gives assurance." It has been argued that it includes terms which can
be implied from the particular circumstances of the offer and the
situation of the parties, as long as the offer itself is in written form.
This construction is certainly possible. The framers of the Uniform
Commercial Code could have restricted the provision to include only
written assurances as the framers of the Uniform Written Obligations Act 3" and the New York General Obligations Law 40 did. The
Uniform Written Obligations Act requires that, "the writing also
contains an additionalexpress statement, in any form of language,
that the signer intends to be legally bound. '" 4 ' The New York General Obligations Law states:
Except as otherwise provided in section 2-205 of the uniform commercial code with respect to an offer by a merchant to buy or sell
goods, when an offer to enter into a contract is made in a writing
signed by the offeror, or by his agent, which states that the offer is
irrevocable during a period set forth or until a time fixed, the offer
shall not be revocable during such period or until such time because
42
of the absence of consideration for the assurance of irrevocability.

A comparison of the New York General Obligations Law with
section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code would indicate

that the Uniform Commercial Code requires less to make an offer
irrevocable than does the New York General Obligations Law.
The latter, with its clear qualification, "except as otherwise provided
36. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-2-205 (Repl. 1962).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 729, 734, 418 P.2d 187, 190
(1966).
39. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 6 (1949). Pennsylvania is the only state which adopted
the Uniform Written Obligations Act.
40. N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 5-1109 (McKinney 1964).
41. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 6 (1949) (emphasis added).
42. N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 5-1109 (McKinney 1964) (emphasis added).

414
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in section 2-205 of the uniform commercial code, ' 4" 3 seems to imply
that the Uniform Commercial Code requires something less than a
"writing . . . which states that the offer is irrevocable . . .-.
Further comparison shows that an offer made irrevocable under
the New York General Obligations Law is irrevocable for any
amount of time stated in the offer. Thus, the consequences of making an irrevocable offer are much more serious under the New York
General Obligations Law than under the Uniform Commercial Code
which limits the time that an offer can be made irrevocable to three
months. 45 The possibility of making an offer irrevocable over a long
period of time is a good reason for making the requirements of the
New York General Obligations Law almost a requirement of form
much like the common law seal. Since an offer cannot be made irrevocable for a period of time longer than three months under section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, it would seem reasonable that the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code would
be less demanding than the requirements of the New York General
Obligations Law.
If section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code were found to
be applicable in Tatsch, the plaintiff would have had to meet two
requirements. First, he would have had to show that the sub-bid
offer had created the required "assurance" in view of the particular
circumstances. Second, he would have had to prove that the offer
was truly for what he said it was; this issue was never resolved by
the supreme court.
Thus, it appears that the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the
firm offer provision of the Uniform Commercial Code may serve to
protect the prime contractor who relies upon an offer submitted by
a subcontractor. If the tests required by section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code are met, there would seem to be no need
to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. But that doctrine
should apply if the code provision is not satisfied and yet the prime
contractor reasonably relies on the subcontractor's bid and such reliance works to his detriment.
JOHN M. WELLS
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
In the New Jersey case, E. A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J.
Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966), the court seemed to imply that to satisfy Section 2-205
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the assurance of irrevocability must actually be in
writing. It should be noted that this was not the highest court in New Jersey.
45. An offer may be made irrevocable for a period longer than three months under
the Uniform Commercial Code but it must be supported by a consideration.

